The Heterodox 'Fourth Paradigm' of Libertarianism: an Abstract Eleutherology plus Critical Rationalism by Lester, J. C.
1 
 
The Heterodox ‘Fourth Paradigm’ of Libertarianism: 
an Abstract Eleutherology plus Critical Rationalism 
 
J. C. Lester 
(Revised October 2019) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
1) Introduction. 2) The key libertarian insight into property and orthodox 
libertarianism’s philosophical confusion. 3) Clearer distinctions for applying to what 
follows: abstract liberty; practical liberty; moral defences; and critical rationalism. 
4) The two dominant (‘Lockean’ and ‘Hobbesian’) conceptions of interpersonal 
liberty. 5) A general account of libertarianism as a subset of classical liberalism and 
defended from a narrower view. 6) Two abstract (non-propertarian, non-normative) 
theories of interpersonal liberty developed and defended: ‘the absence of 
interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-satisfaction’, abbreviated to 
‘no proactively imposed costs’; and ‘no imposed costs’. 7) Practical implications for 
both main abstract conceptions of liberty derived and compared. 8) How this positive 
analysis relates to morals. 9) Concluding conjectures: the main abstract theory of 
liberty captures the relevant interpersonal conception; the new paradigm of 
libertarianism solves the old one’s problems. 
 
“It’s an amazing fact that the nature of liberty is one of the least-discussed topics in what 
libertarians like to call ‘the literature of liberty’.” Irfan Khawaja1 
 
1) Introduction 
 
The issue here is ‘liberty’ (from a Latin root), or ‘freedom’ (from an Anglo-Saxon root). But 
it is not ‘liberty’ in its most general sense: for that also applies outside the social realm, 
including to such matters as arise in physics and engineering (as any internet search shows; 
and it can be hard to preclude such references when one is not interested in them). The issue 
here is only social or interpersonal liberty: the liberty that people have in relation to each 
other. This essay will sometimes refer to ‘interpersonal liberty’ and sometimes simply to 
‘liberty’, but the former is always what is meant. 
 
There is a philosophical approach to libertarianism that is very different from the mainstream, 
or orthodox, varieties.2  It has two principal differences: an abstract theory of interpersonal 
liberty (i.e., non-propertarian and non-normative); and critical-rationalist epistemology3 (i.e., 
 
1. “Review Essay,” Reason Papers 31 (2009): 155. 
2. Three main types are distinguished in E. Mack, “An Epitome of Libertarianism,” The 
Journal of Private Enterprise, 33: 4 (2018): 1–20: “the natural rights approach, the 
cooperation-to-mutual-advantage approach, and the indirect utilitarian approach” (1). 
3. For detailed explanations of critical rationalism see, for instance, K. R. Popper, 
Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul [1963] 1978) and D. W. 
Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open 
Court, 1994). 
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no attempt to provide ‘supporting4 justifications5’ or ‘foundations’).6 This heterodox 
philosophical paradigm remains largely unknown and otherwise largely misunderstood. In 
general attempts to explain different types of libertarianism it is typically completely absent.7 
If for no other reason, therefore, it would seem worthwhile to attempt to explain and defend it 
in outline; and that is one purpose of this essay. However, this is also an attempt to do this 
with more clarity, precision, and context than hitherto; and this has prompted some new 
arguments, explanations, and conjectures.8 The result is still very far from being a pellucidly 
clear9 and completely settled account. It would undoubtedly benefit from greater critical 
scrutiny if only in order to clarify it further, and it might even be significantly corrected or 
utterly refuted. But regardless of how right or wrong this theory is, it poses questions and 
problems that the orthodox varieties don’t and which need to be answered and solved. 
 
2) The key libertarian insight and its confused orthodox interpretations 
 
Whatever the various libertarian theories are stated to be, there appears to be one key insight 
that is behind them all. This is the realisation—if only at an intuitive level—that property 
rights tend to protect and promote two very important things at once: some sense of 
interpersonal liberty as people not interfering with, or initiating constraints on, each other’s 
lives (sometimes generally expressed as ‘live and let live’); and maximal productivity, or 
economic efficiency, that benefits one and all (sometimes generally expressed as ‘a rising tide 
lifts all boats’). However, as we shall see, this insight remains philosophically confused in the 
various orthodox forms of libertarianism: there is no clear analysis and clarification of the 
 
4. ‘Supporting justifications’ entail circularities, infinite regresses, or dogmatic assumptions. 
As critical rationalism explains, all observations, arguments, explanations, and even logical 
inferences rest on, and thus logically amount to, assumptions. They thereby cannot offer 
support that transcends their assumptions (but those assumptions are either true or false, 
depending on the external facts). However, they can be criticised and tested—all within a 
framework of assumptions, of course (and presumably reality will tend to aid true 
assumptions to withstand criticisms and tests better than false ones, and true ones should 
resurface even if mistakenly rejected).  
5. This is emphatically not to object to ‘justification’ used in the completely different sense 
that means explaining a conjecture and squaring (justifying) it with any known criticisms or 
ostensible counterexamples by adequately responding to them (which cannot, of course, offer 
any support to the conjecture: it merely appears to remain unrefuted so far). 
6. It would be possible to accept the abstract theory of liberty but reject or ignore critical 
rationalism. But all the logical problems of attempting to support theories are unavoidable. 
7. It is absent in, for instance, E. Mack, “An Epitome of Libertarianism”; B. v. d. Vossen, 
“Libertarianism” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, plato.stanford.edu, 2019); M. 
Zwolinski, “Libertarianism” (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu, undated: 
accessed 7 December 2018); D. Boaz, “Libertarianism”, (Encyclopædia Britannica, 
britannica.com, undated: accessed 7 December 2018). This is a factual observation, not a 
complaint. 
8. This is partly intended to be a better version of the attempts that were J. C. Lester, “Liberty 
as the Absence of Imposed Cost: The Libertarian Conception of Interpersonal Liberty,” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14: 3 (1997): 277–288, and J. C. Lester, Explaining 
Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments (Buckingham: The University of 
Buckingham Press, 2014), chap. 10. 
9. Some typical, and thereby useful, misunderstandings that arise in one anonymous review 
will be dealt with in footnotes at various points. 
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distinguishable parts. Instead, there is a conflation of certain kinds of deontological rights, 
good consequences, property rights, and ‘supporting justifications’; and all the while being 
oblivious to the, absurd and ironic, fact that there is no explicit theory of interpersonal liberty 
to explain any of this.10 At the same time, these orthodox positions are often perceived and 
presented by advocatory texts as being crystal clear and completely cogent.11 Critical texts 
cite real philosophical problems12,13,14 but they are usually answered with, unwittingly, ad hoc 
manoeuvres.15 The problem is that both the best criticisms and the best defences are fatally 
flawed insofar as they incorrectly assume, as they usually do, that something approximating 
to the current orthodox philosophical assumptions16 is necessary and sufficient to explain 
libertarianism and that supporting justifications17 are possible. General problems with the 
orthodox assumptions will be explained in what follows. More-detailed criticisms can be 
found in the texts cited in the various footnote references. But this essay is primarily a short 
explanation of the heterodox paradigm. 
 
3) A clearer approach: separating distinct issues 
 
An adequate philosophical theory of libertarianism needs to make the following distinctions: 
1) An abstract theory of interpersonal-liberty-in-itself that is independent of any type of 
property (i.e., ownership), or normativity.18 
 
10. Two classic examples are R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1974) and M. N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto 
(Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, [1973, 1978] 2006). But see virtually any 
mainstream libertarian text. The philosophical sophistication of the Nozick text obscures the 
fact that it is at the same time ultimately superficial as regards some of the issues raised in 
this essay. 
11. A good short example is R. Long, “Why Libertarians Believe There Is Only One Right” 
(praxeology.net/onerightREVdraft.doc, accessed May 25, 2016). And see the critical 
response that is Lester, Explaining Libertarianism, chap. 6. 
12. D. Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism (2nd ed. La 
Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), chaps. 41, 42. And see the critical response that is J. C. Lester, 
Escape from Leviathan: Libertarianism Without Justificationism (Buckingham: The 
University of Buckingham Press, [2000] 2012): 71-123. 
13. “For Nozick, … there is justice when there is no restriction on freedom. But freedom is 
then itself defined in terms of non-violation of rights, and the result is a tight definitional 
circle and no purchase either on the concept of freedom or the concept of justice”, G. A. 
Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995): 61. 
14. D. Sobel, “Backing Away from Libertarian Self-Ownership,” Ethics, 123 (2012): 32–60; 
D. Sobel, “Self-Ownership and the Conflation Problem,” Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: 
Volume 3, Mark Timmons (Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): chap. 5. 
15. E.g., W. Block, “David Friedman and Libertarianism: A Critique,” Libertarian Papers, 3: 
35 (2011): 1-33. And see the response that is Lester, Explaining Libertarianism, chap. 8. 
16. Self-ownership, homesteading, just property, and either deontologism or 
consequentialism are somehow ‘foundational’ to libertarianism—and all without an explicit 
theory of liberty. 
17. I.e., “supporting justifications” as such, not of any particular assumptions. A review 
overlooks or misunderstands the references to critical rationalism and asks, “Supporting 
justifications of what?” 
18. It will later be explained how Hobbes’s account in Leviathan is not adequate.  
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2) The practical and contingent, derived, objective applications of the abstract theory. 
3) The separate moral and value defences of the abstract theory and its objective applications. 
4) At every stage the abandonment of ‘supporting justifications’ in favour of critical 
rationalism, which explicitly uses conjectures and criticisms. 
 
That these distinctions are needed should become clearer as this explanation proceeds. This 
approach appears to be sufficiently radical to amount to a different philosophical paradigm of 
libertarianism. And this is a fortiori true if also combined with the extreme version of the, 
implicit, classical-liberal/libertarian compatibility conjecture: there is no systematic practical 
clash between interpersonal liberty (or the libertarian ideology) and want-satisfaction welfare 
(or preference-utilitarian morals). Some general philosophical explanations of this 
compatibility will be suggested at various points, but there cannot be a comprehensive social 
scientific defence of this conjecture here. The following account attempts a new, short, 
explanation of just such theories of liberty and libertarianism. 
 
4) Interpersonal liberty 
 
There are various competing conceptions of interpersonal liberty. But there are only two 
dominant conceptions in both common sense and in political or social philosophy. They are 
not negative liberty and positive liberty, as might be supposed. Rather, they are both types of 
so-called ‘negative liberty’. One conception is that of people not initiating constraints on each 
other. This is something that could, as far as is practical, be universally observed: everyone 
could have maximal such liberty at the same time. This is more or less the conception that 
John Locke (1632-1704) uses in his Second Treatise of Government (1690).19 The other 
conception is that of people not being constraints in any way on each other. And this is 
something that will, in practice, be a universal zero-sum game: someone can gain such liberty 
only at the expense of someone else’s loss of such liberty. This is more or less the conception 
that Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) uses in his Leviathan (1651), but here restricted only to 
interpersonal constraints—which Hobbes does not do.20 Neither conception is usually 
explicitly, clearly, and abstractly theorised, even by libertarian philosophers. Consequently, 
people sometimes switch between one and the other, or conflate the two, without realising 
that this is what they are doing.21 
 
 
19. For instance, in section 57: “Liberty is freedom from restraint and violence by others; and 
this can’t be had where there is no law. This freedom is not—as some say it is—a freedom 
for every man to do whatever he wants to do (for who could be free if every other man’s 
whims might dominate him?); rather, it is a freedom to dispose in any way he wants of his 
person, his actions, his possessions, and his whole property—not to be subject in any of this 
to the arbitrary will of anyone else but freely to follow his own will, all within whatever 
limits are set by the laws that he is under.” However, as we shall see later, bringing in 
“property” and “law” at this stage is partly what prevents this account from being the abstract 
theory of liberty that will be argued to be necessary. 
20. For instance, in chapter xxi. Of the liberty of subjects, “Liberty, or FREEDOME, 
signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall 
Impediments of motion;)” (“Liberty What”); and “A FREE-MAN, is "he, that in those things, 
which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to"” 
(“What It Is To Be Free”). And so we see that Hobbes’s account relates to zero-sum action. 
21. Such due, general, acknowledgements to Locke and Hobbes are not intended to imply 
that what follows is about the details or implications of their specific theories of liberty. 
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5) Libertarianism 
 
‘Libertarianism’, in the social or political sense, is a modern name for a long-existing subset 
of classical liberalism:22 that which advocates maximum interpersonal liberty and either a 
minimal ‘night watchman’ state (minarchy) or no state (anarchy).23 The version of 
interpersonal liberty that libertarianism tends to assume is no-initiated-constraint liberty. This 
will be the primary focus here. However, it sometimes assumes no-constraint liberty. A 
clearer and more explicit theory of each can avoid much philosophical confusion and solve 
many related philosophical problems. This is useful not only for libertarianism; it will also 
apply to the common-sense conceptions whether or not they are being used by libertarians. 
 
Some self-described libertarian texts make the characterisation of ‘libertarianism’ more 
precise. They assume that libertarianism involves “foundational philosophical 
commitments”24 to some combination of certain deontological rights,25 or self-ownership,26 
or the non-aggression principle (or axiom),27 or ‘just’ (i.e., ‘libertarian’) private property, etc. 
This might28 be seen as implying that the overall approach taken here is ‘not, real, 
libertarianism’. Such a position would appear to be somewhat like a Catholic rejecting 
 
22. For instance: “political philosophy that takes individual liberty to be the primary political 
value. It may be understood as a form of liberalism ….” D. Boaz, “Libertarianism”; “full-
fledged libertarianism, as opposed to more moderate forms of classical liberalism.” M. 
Zwolinski, “Libertarianism”; “Depending on the context, libertarianism can be seen as either 
the contemporary name for classical liberalism, adopted to avoid confusion in those countries 
where liberalism is widely understood to denote advocacy of expansive government powers, 
or as a more radical version of classical liberalism.” D. Conway, “Liberalism, Classical”, in 
R. Hamowy, The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism (Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE 
Publications; Cato Institute, 2008): 295–298. 
23. On anarchism, see especially G. de Molinari, The Production of Security (New York: 
Centre for Libertarian Studies, [1849] 1977), and C.-F. Bastiat, The Law 
(http://bastiat.org/en/the_law.html, 1850). But there are also Jakob Mauvillon (1743–1794), 
Julius Faucher (1820–1878), and various others. Hence libertarianism (avant la lettre) seems 
to have long been be a type of classical liberalism, contra S. Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians: 
Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 30, 2 (2001): 
105-151. It is less clear that the politically-correct “liberalism” defended in that essay is 
entirely a version of classical liberalism. 
24. “Most of the libertarian theories we have surveyed in this article have a common 
structure: foundational philosophical commitments are set out, theories are built upon them, 
and practical conclusions are derived from those theories.” M. Zwolinski, “Libertarianism”. 
25. The most well-known being R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 
26. Which even “left libertarianism” makes foundational. See P. Vallentyne, H. Steiner, and 
M. Otsuka, “Why Left-Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A 
Reply to Fried,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33, 2 (2005): 201-215.  
27. For instance, W. Block, “The Non-Aggression Axiom of Libertarianism” 
(LewRockwell.com: http://archive.lewrockwell.com/block/block26.html, 2003). 
28. Or, therefore, it also might not. This is not to imply, as a JLS review incorrectly supposes 
is intended, that all foundationalists would reject this as a form of libertarianism. However, 
some responses appear to do so; not least, W. E. Block, “Response to J. C. Lester on David 
Friedman on Libertarian Theory”, MEST Journal, 7: 1 (2019), 127-155; which, for instance, 
calls “private property rights, the be-all, and end-all of libertarianism, along with the NAP” 
(142). Reply in progress. 
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Protestantism as ‘not, real, Christianity’. It would be dogmatism rather than precision. As 
what follows is explained as a heterodox paradigm of libertarianism in which abstract liberty 
is explicitly theorised and very similar practical implications are derived, it would seem 
perverse to deny that it is a form of libertarianism. If anything, it appears to be more 
coherently libertarian than the mainstream varieties. 
 
6) An abstract theory of interpersonal liberty 
 
6.1 The philosophical problem and its intuitive but incorrect solutions  
 
A ‘practical theory of interpersonal liberty’ can be explained as an attempted account of what 
interpersonal liberty involves in contingent practice as regards rules and consequences. This 
can be done by using an intuition that implies a tacit theory29 of interpersonal liberty; and this 
is what most orthodox accounts of libertarianism do. But if we are explicitly to derive these 
rules and consequences, then we first need to have an explicit, abstract theory of interpersonal 
liberty. An ‘abstract theory of interpersonal liberty’ can be explained as an attempted account 
of what interpersonal liberty is in itself before any contingent practical applications. 
 
How is an abstract theory of the liberty of libertarianism—and thereby also of the relevant 
dominant common-sense conception—to be understood? To have a theory of liberty that 
inherently involves particular property rules and particular moral rights is not to have a 
clearer and stronger theory. Rather, it is to attempt to have an unfalsifiable or uncriticisable 
theory. And that, as Karl Popper explained, is not clearer and stronger: it is really to avoid 
saying anything substantive at all. It is certainly to have no proper theory of liberty. Instead, it 
is in effect to assume the legitimacy or morality of certain rules or rights and then 
stipulatively or persuasively—and thereby vacuously—define those rules or rights as 
‘libertarian’ and their flouting as ‘unlibertarian’ (or even ‘aggression’30, or—still worse—
 
29. A quoted JLS review comment with interspersed replies: This “suggests that intuitions 
about liberty are based on tacit theories of interpersonal liberty”. Yes, intuitions that rules and 
consequences can be categorised as fitting or not fitting liberty in practice thereby imply 
possession of some sort of theory, however muddled or protean, of abstract liberty to sort 
them. However, the far more important—non-psychological—matter here is that the 
possibility of an explicit, abstract theory of liberty is implied by such categorisation. “But it 
isn’t clear that such theories have to be based on complete theories of interpersonal liberty”. 
It is clear that they rarely are; they are usually inchoate and tacit. Why next mention “in 
particular theories of libertarian rights”? Why bring in rights at this stage? Before one can 
coherently assert “libertarian rights” one must first determine what is non-normatively 
libertarian (what factually fits liberty); whether there is a right to that is a separate, later, and 
normative question. “Someone might, […] if Popper is right, have some theory in mind, but it 
might not be a worked-out but tacit complete theory of interpersonal liberty.” Of course it 
isn’t “worked-out” or “complete”. It would hardly be tacit if it were. 
30. The idea that libertarianism is about the absence of aggression, or the Non-Aggression 
Principle (NAP), or Non-Aggression Axiom—as found in W. Block, “The Non-Aggression 
Axiom of Libertarianism”, for instance—means, it is explained, that one should “not initiate 
(or threaten) violence against the person or legitimately owned property of another.” Even if 
we interpret “violence” to mean only ‘violations’, this raises two crucial problems. 1) How do 
we know that any so-called “legitimately owned property” actually fits interpersonal liberty 
(after all, not all property rights fit liberty) unless we have an explicit abstract theory of 
liberty? 2) If “non-aggression” is absolute (as “non” ipso facto implies), then how can any 
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‘coercion’31). Texts that are critical of libertarianism often note this. Therefore, it is better not 
to tie a theory of interpersonal liberty to specific property rules or to specific moral rights. 
Then it can be used independently to assess and explain whether any property rule or any 
moral right is in accord with liberty. Moreover, it is necessary that some such abstract theory 
is possible. For it is always coherent to ask whether, and how, some property rule or moral 
right is compatible with interpersonal liberty as a factual matter—rather than by some 
ideological definition of ‘liberty’ or ‘libertarianism’.32 And if mainstream libertarianism—of 
all ideologies—cannot give a coherent answer to such a question, then it is in a state of 
philosophical confusion that is acutely ironic: it can’t; it is. In any case, the correct 
eleutherology (philosophical study and theorising concerning interpersonal liberty) is a 
fundamental philosophical problem—not only one for libertarians. It is surely no less 
important than the correct epistemology, for instance. Therefore, if the following account is 
not the correct abstract theory of interpersonal liberty, still there must be such an abstract 
liberty to be correctly theorised and it is important that it be attempted. 
 
Is it possible to formulate a libertarian theory of interpersonal liberty that is sufficiently 
abstract such that it is both non-propertarian and non-normative? First consider the dominant 
‘Lockean’ conception. Conceptually, liberty is always about the absence of some kind of 
constraints on something. Here it is about the absence of some kind of constraints on people 
by people: interpersonal constraints (it is not about intrapersonal constraints—limits within a 
person—or the constraints of the natural world). More precisely here, it must be some sense 
of the absence of people initiating—whether intentionally or not—relevant constraints on 
each other in some way: a purely reactive or defensive constraint would preserve 
interpersonal liberty; a proactive or offensive constraint would reduce interpersonal liberty. 
But what, in the most abstract sense, is it about a person that cannot be proactively 
constrained by other people if he is to have his interpersonal liberty? This is the key question. 
 
 
‘boundary crossings’, such as even the smallest pollution, be allowed or otherwise dealt with? 
Rothbard and his followers attempt answers (see, for instance, W. Block, “David Friedman 
and Libertarianism: A Critique”, especially 2.2-2.5); but they do not work (see in response, 
Lester, Explaining Libertarianism, chap. 8, especially 2.2-2.5). 
31. The narrow, plain-English meaning of ‘coercion’ is “the use of force to persuade someone 
to do something that they are unwilling to do” 
(https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/coercion), or “[a]ctual or threatened 
force for the purpose of compelling action by another person” 
(https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/coercion). In this sense, legitimate coercion is not a 
contradiction in terms. A libertarian society would use legitimate coercion to defend liberty 
(and sometimes coercion is contractual or even the whole point of some libertarian 
interaction: boxers are using coercion on each other). However, libertarian texts sometimes 
use ‘coercion’ to mean any action that is ‘unlibertarian’ or flouts ‘libertarian’ property rights. 
For instance, “…liberty is by definition an absence of coercion…”; Tibor Machan, Classical 
Individualism: The Supreme Importance of Each Human Being (Abingdon: Routledge, 1998), 
p.184. 
32. A quoted JLS review comment followed by a reply: “This assumes that in order to answer 
the question, one must have a theory of interpersonal liberty. But couldn’t one attempt to 
answer the question by pre-theoretical intuitions about liberty?” No, “pre-theoretical 
intuitions about liberty” cannot explain “whether, and how, some property rule or moral right 
is compatible with interpersonal liberty as a factual matter”. At most they can assign an 
intuitive libertarian category to the “property rule or moral right”. 
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As we have seen, it cannot be either his property or his rights as such—however intuitive 
such answers may appear.33 It may, of course, be some of, or all of, or only his property or 
rights where these are compatible with liberty. But that brings us back to the problem. 
Without an independent, explicit, and abstract theory of liberty we cannot determine with any 
clarity what is compatible with liberty. The other main intuitive contender is actions. That 
also runs into clear difficulties. Proactive constraints on possible actions that someone does 
not want to perform may not be cared about, or even noticed; so they will not be in any way 
oppressive (felt as constraining). And some proactive constraints on wanted actions will be 
perceived as much more oppressive than others in a way that cannot be explained merely in 
terms of actions. Moreover, sometimes it is not an action but some other wanted state of 
affairs that might be being constrained; and, again, in a way that admits of theoretically 
unexplained degrees of oppression. Therefore, abstract interpersonal liberty also does not 
appear to be about the absence of proactive constraints on actions as such. 
 
6.2 The counter-intuitive but correct solution  
 
So what is being relevantly constrained? The clues are in the references to people’s wants. It 
is the proactive constraining of the satisfaction of wants. This is the most general description 
of what we do not want others to proactively constrain with respect to ourselves. And, 
therefore, it seems to fit what is required for the abstract theory of liberty, despite being a 
counter-intuitive answer for most orthodox libertarians. Hence we can theorise such 
‘libertarian liberty’ as ‘the absence of interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-
satisfaction’ (or ‘preference-satisfaction’: as no distinction is made here). Ex hypothesi, this 
rules out both proactively imposing wants themselves (by—ipso facto unwanted—violent 
threats, fraud, secret drugging, etc.) and want-satisfactions that themselves would proactively 
constrain another person’s want-satisfactions (for constraints on them would not be proactive 
but reactive). Otherwise, the wants may be indefinitely many, heterogeneous in nature, 
sometimes apparently incommensurable, varying in intensity and importance, biological 
necessities, or entirely contingent and transitory. 
 
A focus on—and aggregation of ostensibly disparate types of—want-satisfactions ought not 
to seem too strange. Such want-satisfaction is fairly well understood in economics and in 
utilitarianism: whatever diverse things people actually want, they must in some sense be 
obtaining ex ante utility (or usefulness) from them; and people do make some kind of utility-
maximising trade-offs among all of their own very different types of wants. Want-
satisfaction, in itself, is even one interpretation of ‘utility’ in economics and in preference 
utilitarianism. Preference utilitarianism is distinguished from the other types by not 
necessarily having a positive conscious sensation as an effect or a goal. It has only a 
conscious ‘utility’ as a cause or motive: at the thought of achieving whatever is wanted (even 
if that is never experienced or known to come about by the person who wants it to be). 
Consequently, happy delusions are ruled out—unless those happen to be what someone 
spontaneously does want. Hence preference-utility (or want-satisfaction) is part of what helps 
us to make sense of the abstract conception of liberty and also of liberty’s ultimate 
congruence with maximising one conception of human welfare. For human welfare is rightly 
 
33. What is currently intuitive for holders of any theories may change for them in the light of 
a perceived better alternative. 
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perceived as the other main social desideratum, but wrongly perceived as often in serious and 
systematic conflict with liberty.34 
 
A possible—even likely—criticism may be that this is, therefore, really some strange variety, 
or subset, of utilitarianism being presented as libertarianism. But positively promoting utility 
is no part of this abstract theory of liberty, let alone using some people for the benefit of 
others. The theory solely rules out proactive interpersonal constraints on individuals 
achieving their (non-proactively-constraining) goals. Utility does not even need to be 
mentioned. However, it is sometimes convenient to speak in terms of utility in order to 
explain the congruence of liberty with free-market economics and preference-utilitarian 
welfare. 
 
A further criticism may be that, nevertheless, there are still some interpersonal-utility 
comparisons implied by this theory, and that this is—at the very least—problematic. And 
here it has to be conceded that an element of interpersonal-utility comparison is indeed 
implied. It appears to be theoretically unavoidable for the abstract theory. However, as we 
shall see later, it is only necessary to make the plausible assumption that people are very 
broadly similar in their responses to certain very fundamental choices. This is not to suppose, 
or require, or imply either complete homogeneity or any cardinality of people’s want-
satisfaction responses.35 
 
Now that the abstract theory of interpersonal liberty has been theorised as “the absence of 
interpersonal proactively-imposed constraints on want-satisfaction”, it may be convenient to 
abbreviate this unwieldy expression. ‘No’ is shorter than “the absence of”; we are unlikely to 
forget that it is “interpersonal”, so that can usually be omitted; but “proactively” is crucial 
here, so best included (usually, at least); “constraints on” someone’s “want-satisfaction” 
(from what it otherwise would have been) is an ‘imposed cost’ to him (in the sense of the 
opposite of a merely withheld benefit). Therefore, the full formulation can conveniently be 
abbreviated to ‘no proactively-imposed costs’ (or more briefly, ‘no proactive impositions’). 
Ten words have been reduced to four (or three). Whenever an abbreviated formulation is 
used, the full theory will be implied. Thus any alleged ‘proactively-imposed cost’ must in 
principle be translatable into the longer formulation. But none of these particular words really 
matter. The same abstract theory of liberty might be expressed in a different way, as long as 
the general idea is understood. (And it is now possible simply to add—by analogy with all of 
 
34. As already stated, this conjecture cannot be defended here in social scientific terms. That 
is primarily a task for economists. 
35. At this point a review makes a somewhat muddled intervention: “if rights and non-
aggression are just contingently related to liberty, how is it that wants are intrinsically 
connected to liberty in a way rights are not?  Unless ‘wants’ and ‘liberty’ are equivalent, the 
inherent connection between the two calls out for an explanation that is not given.” A reply is 
best given in stages. 1) It is always best to accurately quote rather than to assume that a 
paraphrase is accurate. 2) To make a conceptual distinction between two things is not to 
imply that they are only “contingently related” (any particular number is conceptually distinct 
from mathematics as a subject, but they are necessarily related). 3) A positive theory of 
interpersonal liberty and what it entails in practice appears to be conceptually separable from 
a normative theory of “rights and non-aggression” and what they entail in practice. 4) It is 
explained in the text how wants relate to an abstract (non-propertarian and non-normative) 
theory of interpersonal liberty. 5) Rights are either propertarian or normative, and so cannot 
be part of any such abstract theory. 
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the foregoing explanation—that the no-constraint, ‘Hobbesian’, theory of interpersonal 
liberty will be ‘no impositions’.) 
 
Note that this verbal formulation is not a definition of the word ‘liberty’. It is a philosophical 
theory about the nature of the abstract liberty that libertarianism, and common sense, 
presupposes or entails. Definitions attempt to provide the meanings of words (whether by 
usage or by stipulation). Theories attempt to provide descriptions of the world. And the world 
includes the realm of all abstractions (which is also inhabited by all the entities of logic and 
mathematics). It is very remiss to fail to make, or fail to grasp, this crucial distinction. It is 
part of the philosophical philistinism of common sense when philosophy is seen as ‘merely 
arguing about words’. Indeed, one orthodox response to what is being discussed here is that it 
is mere semantics that does not really contradict or correct anything in mainstream 
libertarianism.36 As ought to be clear, that response does not bear serious philosophical 
scrutiny.37 
 
This may still appear to be too unlike any theory of what libertarian liberty plausibly could 
be. But we have seen that orthodox libertarianism has no proper abstract theory of liberty, 
and that abstract liberty cannot be explained in terms of property, or rights, or actions. That 
mainstream libertarianism does not have an explicit abstract theory of interpersonal liberty is 
as strange and scandalous as it would be if utilitarianism were to offer no explicit abstract 
theory of utility (in fact there are several). It might also be thought that this unorthodox 
account has not been given a, sufficient, ‘supporting justification’. And that is correct. For, as 
critical rationalism explains, ‘supporting justifications’ are logically impossible. 
Nevertheless, it would still be possible to further explain and defend this abstract account of 
interpersonal liberty at an abstract level. But rather than do that in this new, short, 
explanation, it will now be applied to the apparent contingent circumstances of the world. 
Will it produce the results that libertarianism requires? If it does, then that should itself help 
to explain and defend it. 
 
7) Hypothetical derivations of self-ownership and external property 
 
As initially stated, the focus has been on the no-initiated-constraint—‘Lockean’—view of 
interpersonal liberty. But there are self-described ‘Hobbesian’ libertarians.38 It should be 
illuminating to show how both of the main abstract theories of interpersonal liberty explained 
here can be applied to derive practical conclusions. These are hypothetical derivations 
concerning what the application of abstract liberty factually, or positively, entails; they are 
not advocatory, or normative. Then there is also the issue of whether these approaches are in 
any way different in their practical outcomes. 
 
7.1 Applying no-proactive-imposition liberty 
 
 
36. Private communication. Name withheld to protect the guilty. 
37. A review asks, “How is it that the meanings of words and descriptions of the world are so 
separate?” Put as simply as possible, to define what a word means (“God”, “phlogiston”, 
“Yeti”) is not to assert that the definition describes a real thing. Here we appear to have a real 
abstract thing—a tacit theory of abstract libertarian liberty—and we are attempting to provide 
an explicit theory that accurately describes it. 
38. Such as Hillel Steiner and Jan Narveson. 
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Here interpersonal liberty is interpreted as being free from peoples’ proactively-imposed 
constraints on our want/preference-satisfactions; that is, people are not initiating 
interferences—whether intentionally or not—on our having what we want. If no one is 
proactively constraining us in this way, then we have full interpersonal liberty. If Adam 
initiates any control on—interferes with—Eve’s body against Eve’s preferences, then that is a 
proactive constraint on Eve: the body that, contingently, Eve more or less is. We can imagine 
a world where a person (understood as a unitary consciousness with appropriate capacities) 
does not care about control of their body or is not physically attached to a particular body 
(and can easily move to a different one). In either case, liberty might have different practical 
implications. But in the reality we seem to observe, for Adam to flout Eve’s preferences as 
regards her body is not for Adam to exercise his own interpersonal liberty—as here 
conceived—but to exercise power over another person. And if Eve manages to prevent this, 
then she is not, significantly, proactively imposing on Adam (except, for instance, to the 
trivial, and reciprocal, degree that her body comprises natural resources that Adam might 
otherwise have used39) but reactively defending herself.40 Hence, having ultimate control of 
one’s body normally follows from having (more strictly, maximally applying) such liberty. 
 
39. Therefore, even this example does have some conflict in applying pure liberty. In which 
case it is immediately clear that all that can be achieved is the more libertarian option 
(maximising liberty) and not perfect liberty. Another example might be the non-trivial 
disutility proactively imposed on Adam by Eve’s existence and rejection of him versus the 
extreme disutility of Eve if Adam were to force himself upon her to reduce his disutility. 
40. A quoted JLS review comment with interspersed replies: “The author plausibly 
conjectures that the disutility to an individual from allowing interferences with his body will 
normally outweigh the utility gained by someone who interferes with it.” That utilitarian 
comparison may be true, however what fits abstract liberty is not calculated by what is 
utilitarian. The correct abstract libertarian comparison is that the proactively imposed 
disutility on person A of interferences with A’s body by person B far outweighs any 
proactively imposed disutility on B by his being required not thus to interfere. However, the 
basic idea can also be explained intrapersonally: it is far less of a proactively imposed cost to 
be required not to interfere with other’s bodies than it is to be required to suffer their 
interference with yours. This “seems very plausible for two-person cases, but […] what if one 
person, or the members of a small minority, is hated by a vast number of people and 
elimination of the hated would increase the utility of the majority?” Or, rather, what if it 
would decrease the proactively imposed disutility of the majority that the existence of one 
person, or a minority, causes? This is somewhat similar to one of the many criticisms dealt 
with in Lester, Escape from Leviathan: “ii. A Critic of Religion” (66-69) (not all of those 
criticisms and replies could be incorporated into this relatively brief exposition). However, to 
reply directly but briefly, consider the universalised and long-term effects of institutionalising 
a rule that a sufficiently hated person, or minority, can be put to death to minimise the 
proactively imposed cost that their mere existence causes. This would universally undermine 
toleration and stoke up hatred and fear. No one would dare to become too well known in case 
that somehow turned to infamy. To even express an opinion in public might become a serious 
risk. Therefore, such a rule would appear to allow more proactive impositions that not 
allowing it. Expressed individually, it is a lesser proactively imposed cost by far to know that 
someone you hate continues to live (even though you never need to see him or hear anything 
about him: if you choose to find out about him—or choose to experience media that might 
mention him—then that is not proactively imposed on you) than it is to live in fear that you, 
or any one of the many individuals that you value, can be killed if enough people somehow 
come to feel sufficient hatred. 
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This factual and contingent consequence is before needing to assume the legal institution of 
property (or needing to assume morals either). However, in order better to protect this 
ultimate control of one’s body, it is efficient to institute self-ownership (which can be done 
with spontaneously-arising law41 rather than by state command42). 
 
With external resources (that is, resources external to people’s bodies) it might be supposed 
that, logically, we at least need to derive self-ownership first and proceed from that. This does 
not appear to be the case, for the explanation runs independently: self-ownership does not 
need to be mentioned, or presupposed, or implied. In fact, a living human body can be 
thought of as simply one type of resource; just one that contingently happens to be tied to a 
particular person (intellectually conceived) with very strong and stable fundamental wants or 
preferences about controlling it. However, because bodies are more or less what we are, and 
external resources are not, the situation with external resources is somewhat different. 
 
Once we have begun to use43 a natural resource for some purpose, then it typically 
proactively44 imposes a significant cost on us if someone takes that resource from us or uses 
it in a way that flouts our purposes. By possessing and controlling it we might proactively 
impose a cost on other people too; but this is mainly to the, usually small and reciprocal, 
extent of the unmodified resource’s want-satisfaction value to them. For to be denied a 
benefit that someone else has somehow produced—such as a wooden cabin—is not in itself 
to be proactively imposed on.45,46 Therefore, it appears that the least proactive47 imposition 
 
41. Or ‘natural law’, but only in the same sense that there are natural languages. 
42. See, for instance, B. L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law (San Francisco: Pacific Research 
Institute for Public Policy, 1990). 
43. There need be no labour-mingling. It is possible to find a use for something by its 
remaining as it was found: a beautiful tree outside our abode, or the sunlight that falls daily 
on us. Neither need labour-mingling be using something: to walk across mud is to mix one’s 
labour of walking with that mud, but not thereby to use the mud (which is, we may suppose, a 
mere nuisance). Hence, it is use that is fundamental. 
44. A review asserts that “no account of what ‘proactively’ means or describes is adequately 
given”. Why is this needed? ‘Proactive’ is in most dictionaries; it is the antonym of 
‘reactive’. Perhaps the review means ‘proactively imposed’. However, a little above in the 
text that expression is explained as “initiating interferences”. And earlier still the text 
explains “a purely reactive or defensive constraint would preserve interpersonal liberty; a 
proactive or offensive constraint would reduce interpersonal liberty”. Can this be made 
plainer? The basic idea is more generally expressed simply as an ‘interference’. But rather 
than labour this point further, it is probably easier to deal with specific examples as they 
arise. 
45. However, to simplify matters, this ignores discussions of costs relating to envy, frustrated 
desire, lost status, ‘utility monsters’, and other mainly ‘self-inflicted’, or moral hazard, or 
reciprocal examples: all of which it would, at least overall and in the long term, proactively 
impose more to allow to limit ultimate control by initial use and subsequent voluntarily 
agreed transfer. But see the index of Lester, Escape from Leviathan for relevant discussions 
of such things. 
46. A review asserts that “the claim that ownership does not proactively frustrate the non-
owners’ preferences is ad hoc at this point.” Several responses are relevant. 1) Accurate 
quotation is better than inaccurate attempted paraphrase. 2) There is no such assertion or 
implication. 3) This is “at this point” about ultimate control and not about “ownership”. 4) It 
is stated in the main text that “we might proactively impose a cost on other people too; but 
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on people’s preference-satisfactions is usually to allow ultimate control to the initial user,48 
and thereafter control by voluntarily agreed transfer49 (as mentioned above, these 
interpersonal comparisons plausibly assume only that people are very broadly similar in their 
responses to certain fundamental choices). Assuming the theory of liberty, this entails that it 
usually maximally observes, or instantiates, liberty to have personal ultimate control of 
external resources where one has initiated a use (or subsequently received them by 
voluntarily agreed transfer). This factual and contingent consequence is also before needing 
to assume the legal institution of property (or needing to assume morals). However, in order 
better to protect liberty, it is efficient to institute property rights in such resources.50 
 
In short, we can derive both self-ownership and external private property (usually arising 
from initial use and thereafter voluntarily agreed transfer) because, contingently (for we can 
imagine worlds where this is not so), they maximally observe such interpersonal liberty. They 
are not what interpersonal liberty is in abstract theory, but what maximum interpersonal 
liberty entails in practice (hence they are not, philosophically, the ‘foundational’ assumptions 
of libertarianism—as is often supposed). And once self-ownership and such property are thus 
derived from maximally observing abstract liberty, we can use them as strong, prima facie, 
positive rules as to what is ‘libertarian’: that is, factually maximally liberty-instantiating in 
practice. Therefore, we have arrived at the two main rules that libertarians intuit to fit liberty, 
but now with an explicit, non-propertarian, non-normative, abstract theory of liberty to 
explain that intuition.  
 
 
this is mainly to the, usually small and reciprocal, extent of the unmodified resource’s want-
satisfaction value to them.” 5) It is stated in the footnote that “to simplify matters, this ignores 
discussions of costs relating to envy, frustrated desire, lost status, ‘utility monsters’, and other 
mainly ‘self-inflicted’, or moral hazard, or reciprocal examples …” (and a reference to 
discussions of such issues is given). 6) There is a severe limit on how much detail is possible 
in this relatively short explanation. 
47. A review asserts that “it is not clear how degrees of proactivity are even relevant at this 
point.” It is not about “degrees of proactivity” but ‘degrees of proactively imposed cost’. It 
has already been explained how these can be on both sides with both a person’s body and 
external resources. In all such, ubiquitous, cases liberty can only be maximised. 
48. But exceptions can be imagined, such as where this monopolises a vital natural resource 
that other people would themselves have discovered. 
49. A review asserts that the “conclusion on this point is insufficiently supported”. This is, 
again, to overlook, or reject without explanation, the assumed epistemology that is cited and 
outlined earlier. It would only be relevant to produce a criticism that is inconsistent with the 
text. 
50. A review asserts that “the notion that property and trade maximize liberty (and not merely 
want satisfaction) […] requires both [1] data to show that property and trade do satisfy wants 
more than the alternatives and [2] an explanation of how those satisfied wants are indeed of 
the type that are included in the theory of liberty.” Replies to both points follow. 1) This is 
philosophy and not social science, so empirical “data” cannot usually be more than 
background assumptions. Assuming critical rationalism (as this essay does), which includes 
falsificationism, no amount of “data” can “show” (i.e., support or justify) anything. What has 
here been called the “classical-liberal/libertarian compatibility conjecture” cannot be 
defended here apart from a few passing philosophical aspects. 2) A philosophical explanation 
has been provided of the fundamental relationship between want-satisfaction and the property 
and trade that is implied by applying the abstract theory. 
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Such ‘rule libertarianism’ (but non-moral at this stage) is analogous with rule utilitarianism. 
This may sound odd mainly because orthodox libertarianism jumps straight to normative 
rules without any explicit non-normative, act-libertarian, abstract theory. It might even seem 
that this abstract theory necessarily implies act-libertarianism. But that seems to be as 
mistaken as the view that utilitarianism necessarily implies act-utilitarianism instead of rule-
utilitarianism.51 Now that these practical property rules are derived, it is only necessary to go 
back to the abstract theory of interpersonal liberty in problem cases or to answer further 
philosophical questions. 
 
However, there is an immediate and obvious problem that has already been touched on with 
respect to deriving self-ownership and external-resource ownership. Very often a near-
absence of proactive impositions is impossible because there is a significant reciprocal clash. 
For instance, either you suffer the smoke-pollution from my fire or I suffer going without 
warmth and cooking: both the allowance and the disallowance of the fire will proactively 
impose, but on different people (confused criticisms of deontological or rule libertarianism 
often see only the allowance of pollution as imposing52).53 In such cases it is impossible to 
achieve anywhere near perfect liberty or to apply any plausible interpretation of the so-called 
‘non-aggression principle’, for liberty can only be maximised as best as is practical; and this 
might involve compromise or compensation. It is important not to misunderstand this point. 
Dealing with inevitable clashes by maximising liberty might appear to be collectively 
consequentialist (in some non-moral sense at this stage, at least). But that can’t be right; for 
no one’s liberty is curtailed in order to promote the maximum liberty of other people in 
general. It’s simply that maximisation is all that is possible when specific liberties conflict. 
These specific liberties might include indefinitely large groups of indeterminate people (‘the 
public’), and be best dealt with by a class, or representative, law suit. But even such 
‘collective’ minimising of proactively imposed costs on indeterminate people is not 
‘collectivist’ in any way that overrides libertarian individualism in principle. As a 
consequence, applying this theory of liberty inherently internalises externalities (but in a pre-
propertarian sense) as far as is practical and thereby tends to be economically efficient. And 
this is one significant philosophical link between liberty or libertarianism and want-
satisfaction or preference-utilitarianism. 
 
Once all this is understood, it is possible to apply the abstract theory of liberty to derive 
relatively precise and clear implications for an indefinite variety of other issues within 
libertarianism. For instance, intellectual property, restitution and retribution, emergency 
situations, etc.54 But none of this can be attempted here. 
 
7.2 Applying no-imposition liberty 
 
 
51. If the compatibility conjecture is true, then libertarian rules are also utilitarian rules.  
52. For instance, M. Zwolinski, “Libertarianism and pollution: the limits of absolutist 
moralism” (Institute of Economic Affairs, Blog, 20 February, 2015). And see the reply that is 
Lester, Arguments for Liberty: a Libertarian Miscellany, (Buckingham: The University of 
Buckingham Press, [2011] 2016), chap. 31. 
53. Either of us could move our dwelling places, of course. But that would be, we may 
assume, an even greater proactive imposition on whichever side did this. 
54. As found throughout Lester, Escape from Leviathan; Arguments for Liberty; and 
Explaining Libertarianism. 
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As we have seen, a straightforward no-constraint-on-actions approach to interpersonal liberty 
is in itself more or less zero-sum: if you have more interpersonal liberty, then someone else 
has just that much less. By this conception, a slave-owner qua slave-owner has more liberty 
where, and to the exact extent that, his slaves have less: whatever he can enforce that the 
slaves cannot prevent. Such zero-sum interpersonal liberty cannot in itself be maximised or 
protected; it can only be competed over or redistributed for some non-liberty reason—such as 
utility or equality. Therefore, it cannot be the liberty required by most versions of 
libertarianism (and one common-sense conception). Yet some libertarian texts do seem to 
accept it. They usually opt for something along the lines of ‘maximum like (i.e., similar or 
equal) [valuable] liberty for all’—the word ‘valuable’ often being implicit.55 Hence, in these 
theories, liberty-in-itself cannot be the criterion or the goal that is to be maximised or 
protected. They have the rather different criterion or goal of valuable liberties that all can 
share equally. 
 
However, if the subjective intensities of interpersonal impositions are taken into account, then 
this does allow for a liberty-maximising interpretation. Adam might prefer to have ultimate 
control of Eve’s body. And Eve prefers that Adam doesn’t. In the event of such clashes of no-
imposition liberty, the most ‘libertarian’ (i.e., liberty-instantiating) approach is to have 
whichever option is the lesser constraint.56 Almost universally, it is a greater constraint on 
one’s preference-satisfactions to have any aspects of one’s body under someone else’s 
ultimate control than it is to be denied any similar control of another person’s body (or to 
have any other system of bodily control). Therefore, no-imposition liberty is maximally 
observed if people have ultimate control of their own bodies. This factual consequence is 
before the legal institution of property (and also before morals) needs to be assumed. 
However, an efficient way to protect this ultimate control of one’s body is then to 
institutionalise this as the property right of self-ownership. 
 
A similar type of argument also applies to the control of all other resources. It is typically a 
greater constraint on our preference-satisfactions for other people to deny us ultimate control 
of the resources we already use (and thereafter receive by voluntarily agreed transfer), than it 
is to be denied access to resources that others are already using. Etc., etc.57 
 
55. For instance, “every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible 
with the possession of like liberty to every other man” and “each has freedom to do all that he 
wills provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other”; Herbert Spencer, Social 
Statics (John Chapman: London, 1851), chap. 4, sec. 3. More recently, “everyone has an 
equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with the like liberty for all”; John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1971), sec. 11. 
56. With the possibility of compensation in certain cases. Perhaps where there is no similar 
reciprocity, for instance. 
57. A review asserts that “[1] The argument of [this section] seems to apply equally well to 
the author’s argument, [2] for the author never shows that want satisfaction is a non-zero-sum 
game, [3] nor does the author make a convincing case that interpersonal liberty, as defined by 
rights or some other criteria, is actually zero sum.” There appears to be confusion here. 1) 
This section shows how it is possible to avoid the zero-sum-game interpretation of 
‘Hobbesian’ liberty “if the subjective intensities of interpersonal impositions are taken into 
account”. 2) This essay’s main theory is not about mere want-satisfaction but the absence of 
proactive constraints on want-satisfaction. 3) Interpersonal liberty as somehow “defined by 
rights” may very well not be zero-sum. But, for the reasons explained, that cannot be an 
abstract theory of liberty (which does indeed use “some other criteria”).  
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7.3 Do these two theories have any different practical outcomes? 
 
In light of these two explanations of interpersonal liberty, one important question 
immediately arises: are they fully equivalent in terms of what they entail in practice? Both 
conceptions of interpersonal liberty appear—at least initially—to have the same practical 
implications. Thus one could explain interpersonal liberty using either. With the no-
imposition approach, we still have to say that a slave-owner is having his liberty lessened if 
his slaves are freed without his consent; just not as much liberty as his slaves gain by being 
freed. Similarly, a would-be murderer has less liberty if his target-victim escapes; just not as 
much as his target-victim preserves his liberty by escaping that intended murder. This seems 
to be a coherent account. However, it is not how people mainly think about interpersonal 
liberty—either as self-described libertarians or otherwise. People typically think that when 
someone escapes proactively-imposed slavery he gains liberty; but his previous master has 
lost only his power over him. And the would-be murderer does not have his liberty lessened 
if his target-victim escapes him; his target-victim’s liberty is simply preserved. Thus the no-
imposition view fails to capture the intuitions that people usually have (as a matter of fact: 
this is not to advocate anything here) that there is a real causal and also moral difference 
between withholding a benefit and proactively imposing a cost even when the outcomes are 
the same. Consider a well-known example in the philosophical literature: coming across a 
drowning child in a shallow pond. Not saving the child will usually be viewed as morally 
reprehensible and despicable, but it is not usually viewed as causally or morally equivalent to 
pushing a child into the pond so that he drowns: to the equivalent of murder.58 Hence it is 
closer to the main libertarian, and also more popular, approach to view abstract interpersonal 
liberty as the absence of people’s proactively-imposed constraints on our preference-
satisfactions. And that fact possibly means that it is more stable and less costly to preserve. If 
so, other things being equal, more liberty should result. Thus that may be one important 
practical difference, after all. 
 
Nevertheless, there are—as mentioned—some self-described “Hobbesian” libertarians 
(although they would probably not give the same account as here). And there are also anti-
libertarians that take a Hobbesian approach to liberty. Therefore, it is useful to be able to 
explain both of these two approaches. It is also possible that one of these approaches is in 
some way logically incoherent or in some other way unfixably faulty. In which case, it is 
good to have the other to fall back on. But if they are both logically incoherent or unfixably 
faulty, then that would mean starting again. For it seems that there must be a tacit, non-
propertarian, non-normative, abstract conception of interpersonal liberty that distinguishes 
between those rights, property rules, and activities that instantiate (or fit) liberty and those 
that do not. And so an explicit account of that conception should be possible. 
 
8) Libertarian morals 
 
An abstract theory of interpersonal liberty and of what it entails in practice has now been 
broadly explained. Orthodox libertarianism brings morals into the picture before this has been 
done. But it seems that only after this has been done can it be fully coherent to ask ‘how does 
liberty and what it entails relate to morals?’ Given—as seems to be the case—that there 
 
58. Matters would be different if one were contractually employed as a lifeguard: then not 
saving the child would be proactively imposing by breaking one’s contractual duties (on 
deriving contracts see Lester, Escape from Leviathan, 80-85). 
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cannot be any supporting justifications, it can only be a bold conjecture that such abstract and 
practical libertarianism is morally preferable to any alternative. This conjecture needs to be 
defended in the light of any criticisms that arise. It can be explained and defended how there 
does not appear to be any significant clash between libertarianism and the most defensible 
versions of various morally desirable things: rights and duties, justice, social justice, a social 
contract, human flourishing, human welfare, etc. But this does not mean that libertarianism is 
thereby morally supported by any of these things (or any combination of them). It remains a 
separate conjecture that libertarianism is morally desirable, and all moral criticisms are 
potential refutations that require adequate responses.59 
 
 
9) Concluding conjectures 
 
This philosophical essay is, ineluctably, more than averagely broad and speculative. 
Consequently, even if it were not assuming critical rationalism, it is not being presented as 
completely clear and convincing. However, it would be remiss not to conclude with some 
bold60 conjectures that ought to be eminently criticisable. As regards interpersonal liberty, the 
abstract theory captures and explains it. As regards libertarianism, a “paradigm shift”61 is 
required. The fundamental philosophy involved with mainstream libertarianism is a refuted 
and “degenerating research programme”.62 The philosophy involved with this new paradigm 
is an unrefuted and highly fruitful one. It offers a clearer understanding, better and more 
comprehensive solutions to problems, and more convincing replies to criticisms. However, 
despite its radical and important differences, the new paradigm is not fundamentally 
ideologically at odds with libertarianism itself—although that is sometimes the mainstream 
perception. For it reaches more or less the same conclusions63 but with greater philosophical 
clarity and cogency. 
 
 
59. A review suggests, without any explanation (or ‘justification’), that this short section 
should be omitted. Perhaps the implied reason is that it is better to say nothing about 
libertarian morals rather than to fail to produce a scholarly length ‘justification’ of what is 
being explained here. But to say nothing may leave it mysterious to many readers how morals 
are supposed to relate to libertarianism with this theory. Or it may be thought that morals are 
still what will give it a ‘supporting justification’. Or it may be supposed that morals are 
implied to be not needed. 
60. A JLS review notes the Popperian approach to bold conjectures but suggests that “it does 
not follow from accepting this methodology that one must make bold and extravagant 
comments about the value of one’s conjectures”. However, no specific examples are quoted 
or explained to be “extravagant”. And none of the comments ought to be read as intentionally 
“extravagant”, although a sound criticism may reveal them to be so. 
61. To put it in the terms used and popularised by Thomas Kuhn. 
62. To put it in the terms used by Imre Lakatos. Referring to Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos 
might seem to be epistemologically promiscuous and inconsistent. However, the different 
expressions seem to capture important phenomena. Also, Kuhn’s approach can be interpreted 
as more sociological than epistemological. And Lakatos did not see his own work as 
contradicting Popper’s basic epistemology.  
63. It deals precisely with any exceptions in a principled way where mainstream 
libertarianism is either unable to answer or is forced to make ad hoc assumptions. 
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So far, this heterodox paradigm has been largely unnoticed or ignored. Where it has 
occasionally been subjected to criticism64 it appears to have been misunderstood.65 This is 
only to be expected. It is sufficiently radically different from the current orthodoxy to confuse 
most mainstream libertarians, even philosophers.66 It is still ‘axiomatic’ to them that self-
ownership, ‘just’ property, and some version of morality are somehow ‘foundational’ to 
explaining and ‘justifying’ libertarianism philosophically (and all without an explicit, abstract 
theory of liberty), despite the increasingly obvious problems with such assumptions. It will 
only slowly become clear that it is necessary to make the philosophical distinctions of 
abstract liberty, applied liberty, and moral defences, while using critical-rationalist 
epistemology.67,68 
 
64. For instance, D. Gordon and R. A. Modugno, Book Reviews, Journal of Libertarian 
Studies, 17, 4 (2003): 101–109; D. Frederick, “A Critique of Lester’s Account of Liberty,” 
Libertarian Papers, 5, 1 (2013): 45-66; “Adversus Homo Economicus: Critique of Lester’s 
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